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Abstract
Loan book management is important to community credit union survival, particularly 
in deprived localities. Consistent with agency theory, prior studies of credit unions 
report an association among individual monitoring mechanisms, trade association 
monitoring, and female board representation, respectively, and reduced loan losses. 
This study provides a more nuanced understanding by investigating the moderating 
influence of these monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between loan losses 
and deprivation and by considering the effect of bundle combinations of different 
levels of the two monitoring mechanisms on loan losses. The results reveal that credit 
unions subject to trade association monitoring have the lowest loan losses. However, 
in the absence of trade association monitoring, female board representation has a 
moderating effect on loan losses as deprivation increases. Finally, trade association 
monitoring and female board representation have a substitutive, rather than a 
complementary effect on loan losses.
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Introduction
Community credit unions (hereafter called credit unions) are self-help, co-operative 
organizations that offer financial services to their respective communities, including to 
individuals in deprived localities with restricted access to banks. Credit unions are 
well placed to mitigate income and health inequalities in deprived localities by provid-
ing financial services to those who are financially excluded (Marmot et al., 2020; 
Saunders, 2019). The increased financial risk from transacting with members who live 
in deprived localities highlights the importance of financial monitoring to mitigate the 
threat to credit union survival from loan losses (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014). Governing 
boards set strategy, perform a control function, and represent stakeholders. Credit 
union boards act on behalf of their members and regulators (Van Puyvelde et al., 
2012). Therefore, they are exposed to agency conflicts and, as with for-profit (FP) 
organizations, it is recognized that monitoring mechanisms mitigate agency exposure 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Prior nonprofit (NP) research investigates the indepen-
dent association between, respectively, trade association monitoring and female 
board representation on financial risk in credit unions (Forker & Ward, 2012; Ward 
& Forker, 2017).
The management literature on FPs however identifies that governance mechanisms 
do not act independently of each other, that each mechanism has distinct characteris-
tics, roles and functions, and that the effectiveness of one is affected by the presence 
or level of other governance mechanisms (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Schepker & Oh, 
2013). Therefore, financial management is influenced by the efficiency of bundle 
combinations of governance mechanisms as opposed to one mechanism. It is claimed 
that a focus on the “independent” effects of governance mechanisms can lead to incor-
rect conclusions about the effectiveness of individual mechanisms as they interac-
tively influence organizational outcomes in a complex way (Aguilera et al., 2008; Oh 
et al., 2018).
Theoretically, this study contributes by identifying the significance of bundling dif-
ferent levels of two monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between locality 
deprivation and loan losses in credit unions. Empirically, the study uses panel data 
spanning a 10-year period from 2002 to 2011 to examine the effectiveness of bundle 
combinations of different levels of trade association financial monitoring and female 
board representation in reducing loan losses in credit unions in Northern Ireland. 
Given the importance of a credit union’s loan book in generating income to cover 
costs, maintain statutory reserves and provide distributions, loan losses provide a good 
indication of credit union financial risk. The ratio of the Registrar for Credit Unions 
and Industrial and Provident Societies’ (the Registrar’s) recommended allowance for 
loan losses to gross loans is a consistent measure across all credit unions (Forker & 
Ward, 2012).1 The findings provide additional evidence on how a credit union can bet-
ter manage their loan losses by designing monitoring mechanisms effectively.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section outlines the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. This is followed by the data and methodology. 
Descriptive statistics and results are then outlined. The latter part of the study contains 
the discussion, limitations, and the conclusions.
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Theory and Hypotheses Development
Communities constitute an important dimension in the social environment by facilitat-
ing networks and fostering social capital. Communities are not homogeneous as dif-
ferences result across socioeconomic environments. Deprivation has negative 
consequences for a person’s wealth and is linked to health inequalities and life expec-
tancy (Marmot et al., 2020). Access to personal credit when used appropriately can 
help people manage and improve their lives and circumstances (Saunders, 2019). 
Credit unions are typically located within the community they serve and are designed 
to cater the needs of members who are financially excluded. Credit unions do not typi-
cally receive grant funding, interest income on loans to members is a credit union’s 
main source of income, thus financial risk and survival is inherently linked to their 
members’ socioeconomic status (Ward & McKillop, 2005). Credit unions typically 
require evidence of a period of sustained saving behavior, personal relationships, and 
member guarantors when making credit decisions. This is of primary importance in 
deprived localities where information asymmetry is greater and where members have 
little or no collateral or credit history (Mersland, 2011). Despite the inherent safe-
guards, the risk of default is higher in deprived localities, and Ward and McKillop 
(2005) report that credit unions in deprived locations are more likely to have weaker 
financial performance. Therefore, given the link between member wealth and the risk 
of default, it is hypothesized that the potential for loan losses is greater in credit unions 
located in deprived localities:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive association between locality deprivation 
and loan losses.
Monitoring Mechanisms, Locality Deprivation, and Loan Losses
Credit union governance is notable for the close relationship among the board and 
members, managers, staff, and volunteers. Indeed, in most credit unions, board posi-
tions are voluntary, and recruitment is restricted to members only.2 Accordingly, NP 
governance extends beyond standard agency theory to incorporate insights from stake-
holder, stewardship (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012), and resource dependence theories 
(RDT; Ward & Forker, 2017). Although there are differences in respect of the catego-
rization of stakeholder groupings as either principals or agents, there is a consistent 
view that the overarching responsibility of the board is to protect and enhance mem-
bership benefits through a variety of functions including access to external resources, 
advising management, and controlling agency costs. Monitoring mechanisms are pre-
dicted to attenuate agency conflicts and reduce financial risk (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). However, many of the monitoring mechanisms identified in FP studies are not 
available in credit unions due to their legal form, such as the market for corporate 
control, investor monitoring, and share-based incentives (Oh et al., 2018; Rediker & 
Seth, 1995).
This study investigates the effectiveness of two monitoring mechanisms available 
to credit unions on the control of loan losses. The first monitoring mechanism—trade 
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association quarterly monitoring—is external, costly, and targets financial manage-
ment. Trade associations are self-regulatory bodies that typically provide representa-
tion, training, and guidance to their affiliated credit unions (Forker et al., 2014). In 
addition, some trade associations provide a monitoring role, wherein financial man-
agement is assessed by comparing financial ratios to predefined target ratios (PEARLS 
ratios) set by the World Council for Credit Unions (WOCCU, 2017). These target 
ratios are recommended and, when breached, may spark a field audit by the trade asso-
ciation (Forker & Ward, 2012). Forker and Ward (2012) and Ward and Forker (2017) 
report that affiliation to a trade association that provides quarterly financial monitoring 
is associated with lower loan losses in credit unions in Northern Ireland. Therefore, it 
is hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): There is a negative association between trade association 
financial monitoring and loan losses in community credit unions.
Moreover, as credit policies typically do not consider a member’s ability to repay the 
loan, it is hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Trade association financial monitoring does not moderate 
the positive association between locality deprivation and loan losses.
The second monitoring mechanism, female representation on the board (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009), is internal and associated with lower loan losses in credit unions (Ward 
& Forker, 2017). It is reported that women are systematically different to men—cog-
nitively, physiologically, and psychologically (Zalata et al., 2019). Women are on 
average less aggressive, competitive, self-interested, and overconfident, and more 
altruistic, cautious, communal, fair, objective, conservative, and responsible. These 
traits enable them to monitor more intensely relative to men, and FP studies identify 
that women on boards improve board monitoring (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Jonsdottir 
et al., 2015; Zalata et al., 2019).3 RDT identifies benefits from female representation 
on boards due to stronger links with the membership and a capacity to build better trust 
relationships with borrowers compared with men, resulting in lower defaults (Beck 
et al., 2013; Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014; Hartarska et al., 2014). As an association 
between female representation on boards and loan losses is noted in credit unions 
(Ward & Forker, 2017), it is hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): There is a negative association between female representa-
tion on boards and loan losses.
Variation in the extent of monitoring undertaken by women directors is expected 
as the literature identifies that shifts in the gender composition of the board influ-
ences board dynamics and decision-making (Hillman et al., 2007). Specifically, 
female voice, or male voice, is only likely when a critical mass of women, or men, 
is present on the board (Kanter, 1977a, 1977b; Torchia et al., 2011). Female 
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directors on boards with less than this “magic proportion” are likely to be token 
appointments or may form coalitions that have some impact on board dynamics 
but are still outnumbered by the dominant group. Hence, decision-making in gen-
eral does not reflect the gender voice (Joecks et al., 2013). It is also argued that 
gender no longer influences decision-making when boards are gender-balanced as 
the focus turns to the different abilities and skills of individuals (Kanter, 1977a). 
Therefore,
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Female-dominant boards have lower loan losses relative to 
male-dominant boards.
Residual information asymmetry is predicted to be greater in more deprived com-
munities where members have little or no collateral or credit history (Mersland, 
2011). Cao et al. (2015) find that when information asymmetry is perceived to be 
greater, board independence is more important and RDT predicts that female leader-
ship has comparative advantage over boards that do not have female leadership in 
terms of reduced information asymmetry due to stronger network links (Brown et al., 
2012). Consistent with this view, in a study on gender and banking, Beck et al. (2013) 
suggest that females have comparative advantage in informal settings, as they are 
better able to build trust relationships with borrowers. Therefore, we expect female 
leadership to have a relatively stronger influence on the management of loan losses in 
credit unions located in the most deprived communities. Therefore, it is hypothesized 
as follows:
Hypothesis 3c (H3c): Female board representation moderates the positive associa-
tion between locality deprivation and loan losses.
Effect of Bundling Trade Association Monitoring and Female Board 
Representation on Loan Losses
As different monitoring mechanisms are used to reduce agency costs, it is claimed the 
behavior and effectiveness of each mechanism is influenced by the levels of other 
mechanisms (Rediker & Seth, 1995), and they interactively influence organizational 
outcomes in a complex way by either complementing or substituting for each other 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Oh et al., 2018). The complementary perspective is that gover-
nance mechanisms complement each other to synergistically improve outcomes for 
the organization. Hence “more” is better. In contrast, the substitutive view is that there 
are no complementary benefits from using multiple governance mechanisms. When 
governance mechanisms act as substitutes, fewer mechanisms are required to improve 
financial management.
Although constrained in NP settings, the substitute versus complement approach 
can be applied to examine the effect of bundling different levels of two monitoring 
mechanisms (Rediker & Seth, 1995). In the context of the study site, credit unions 
choose to affiliate or not to a trade association that undertakes quarterly financial 
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monitoring. Therefore, two distinct levels of external monitoring exist, one low and 
one high. In addition, to cater for differences in board dynamics resulting from critical 
levels of males and females (Kanter, 1977a), boards are categorized as male dominant, 
diversified, or female dominant, with the latter two deemed to be high relative to the 
former two. Under the complement versus substitute approach, the effectiveness of 
each monitoring mechanism in mitigating agency cost is influenced by the level of 
monitoring undertaken by the other monitoring mechanism.
A complementary effect arises when the mechanisms operate synergistically to 
reduce loan losses. For example, women are reported to undertake monitoring and 
resource provision roles (Jonsdottir et al., 2015) including strengthening networks 
with stakeholders, including borrowing members, and may switch efforts to the 
resource provision role when credit unions are subject to quarterly external financial 
monitoring. Strengthened links with borrowing members may lead to further reduc-
tions in loan losses. Therefore,
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Trade association monitoring and female board representa-
tion have a complementary effect on loan losses.
A substitutive effect is evident when the benefit of one mechanism is high in reduc-
ing loan losses at a low level of the other mechanism and vice versa. For example, 
when the quarterly financial management system identifies financial weakness, a site 
visit ensues (Forker & Ward, 2012). Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that female 
board representation attenuates agency problems by improving monitoring on boards 
when governance and monitoring are weak. Finally, Mersland (2011) argues that in 
micro finance institutions, connection to the membership is more important in the 
absence of monitoring. Therefore,
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): Trade association monitoring and female board representa-
tion have a substitutive effect on loan losses.
The Moderating Effect of Monitoring Bundle on the Association 
Between Locality Deprivation and Loan Losses
Oh et al. (2018) report that organizations have strategic flexibility when designing 
governance practices and do so to achieve their optimal outcome, depending on their 
circumstances. Quarterly trade association monitoring is costly. Cost is particularly 
pertinent for credit unions in deprived locations that operate with higher levels of 
inherent financial risk. To examine whether credit union boards select different bundle 
combinations to minimize loan losses given their specific environment, it is hypothe-
sized as follows:
Hypothesis 5 (H5): There is a moderating effect of bundle combinations on the 
positive association between locality deprivation and loan losses.
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Data and Methodology
Data
The panel data set consists of 1,734 yearly observations from 182 credit unions 
registered with the Registrar over the 10-year period from 2002 to 2011 and was 
hand-collected.
Dependent Variable
Loan losses are the Registrar’s ratio of expected loan losses at the financial year-end 
divided by gross loans outstanding at the year-end (Forker & Ward, 2012). The allow-
ance is made up of 10% for loans overdue between 10 and 18 weeks, 20% for loans 
overdue between 19 and 26 weeks, 40% for loans overdue between 27 and 39 weeks, 
60% for loans overdue between 40 and 52 weeks, and 100% for loans overdue for 
more than 52 weeks. A higher ratio indicates weaker credit management.
Independent Variables
Community deprivation. Community deprivation is captured by a locality-specific mul-
tiple deprivation measure (MDM) assigned to the credit union’s postcode by the 
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). The MDM is a continuous 
measure ranging from 2.08 to 83.33. It is time invariant for each credit union. It com-
prises a low-income factor, a low-employment factor, an education factor, a housing 
factor, an access to services factor, a social environment factor, and a health factor 
(NISRA, 2010). The higher the value the more deprived the location. The 2010 MDMs 
are based on data collected over the period 2007 to 2009. MDMs published in 2005 are 
also available. However, the 2010 MDM is calculated using different underlying vari-
ables, and the two measures are not directly comparable. The differences in the rank 
orderings by location of the two MDMs between the two periods were statistically 
tested and were not found to be statistically significant. This lends some credibility to 
the use of a constant MDM per location over the whole period from 2002 to 2011. The 
models used in this study were also estimated using the two measures, respectively, 
but the key regression model estimates were found to be robust to the use of either 
variant of this measure.
Trade association financial monitoring. Credit unions affiliated to the Irish League of 
Credit Unions (ILCU) are subject to WOCCU’s (2017) financial management system 
including quarterly monitoring. All other credit unions are not. Two categorical vari-
ables are used to distinguish between credit unions that are subject to quarterly monitor-
ing (T) and those that are not (N). Each variable is coded 1 if T or N, and 0 otherwise.
Female board representation. As the behavior of women on boards is sensitive to the 
strength of their voice relative to males (Kanter, 1977a, 1977b; Torchia et al., 2011), 
female board representation ( f ) in this article is categorized, first, as a continuous 
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variable, the percentage of women on the board (%WOB), and then into three cate-
gorical variables: female-dominant boards (F), coded 1 for boards where male direc-
tors do not have a critical mass, 0 otherwise; diversified boards (D), coded 1 for 
boards where both male and female directors have a critical mass, 0 otherwise; and 
male-dominant boards (M), coded 1 for boards where female directors do not have a 
critical mass, 0 otherwise. In this article, critical mass is assumed to be a third of the 
board, a proportion that lies between the widely cited 30% and 40% (Joecks et al., 
2013). Tangential support for use of such a three-way classification is evident from 
the empirical literature on community financial institutions. For example, Hartarska 
and Nadolnyak (2012) report a nonlinear relationship between %WOB and perfor-
mance in Microfinance Institutions (MFIs).4
Monitoring bundle. In this study, a bundle approach is applied to investigate the effect 
on loan losses of six combinations of the two specific monitoring mechanisms. The 
bundle combinations are as follows: quarterly financial monitoring by trade associa-
tion with female-dominant boards (TF), with diversified boards (TD), and with male-
dominant boards (TM); not subject to quarterly financial monitoring by trade 
association with female-dominant boards (NF), diversified boards (ND), and with 
male-dominant boards (NM). These yield categorical variables representing the six 
mutually exclusive bundle combinations kj: k1 = TF, k2 = TD, k3 = TM, k4 = NF, 
k5 = ND, k6 = NM, where j = 1, . . ., 6, and each variable is coded 1 if adopting that 
particular bundle combination, and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
The control variables included to capture other influences on credit union loan losses 
are size (s = log of total assets), age (AGE = log of age), number on board (n), and a 
set of year effects (YEAR). Prior studies report that size is important to credit union 
performance (Forker & Ward, 2012; Ward & Forker, 2017; Ward & McKillop, 2005); 
therefore, a negative association is predicted between size and loan losses, as larger 
credit unions are more likely to have an experienced paid manager (McKillop et al., 
2005). Age is also important. Young credit unions are less likely to have saturated their 
potential membership and can be more selective when awarding credit. Hence, a posi-
tive association is expected between age and loan losses (Forker & Ward, 2012). Larger 
boards are assumed to reap benefits under RDT due to the increased links with outside 
networks. However, they also are associated with increased conflict in decision-mak-
ing. In the NP literature, Bradshaw et al. (1992) report no association between board 
size and budget growth, Galema et al. (2012) conclude that larger boards in MFIs are 
less efficient, and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2012) find a nonlinear association in com-
munity development loan funds. The net impact of the offsetting effects is unclear.
Method
Given the nature of the relatively short panel data available and the fact that the key 
research questions are focused around either time-invariant variables—for example 
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MDM—or variables that move glacially over time, for example %WOB, we use a cor-
related random-effects (CRE) linear model that treats the underlying observations as a 
conventional panel data set. The primary advantage of the CRE approach in the cur-
rent setting is that it is more flexible than fixed-effects and allows for the inclusion and 
identification of the effects of both time-invariant and time-varying variables. The 
CRE model is normally used in balanced panels; however, adjustments by Wooldridge 
(2019) enable the CRE model to be adapted for unbalanced panels. This model is 
applied in this study.
The model specification for estimating the effect of trade association monitoring 
and female board representation on the association between MDM and loan losses 
(H1, H2a, H2b, H3a, H3b, and H3c) is specified as follows:
loanlosses a a MDM a T a f a T MDM a f MDMit i it it it i it i= + + + + ( ) +× ×0 1 2 3 4 5 ( )
+ + + + +
=
∑a s a AGE a n YEAR uit it it
t




   (1)
where i = 1, . . ., N; t = 2002 to 2011.
The moderating effect of trade association monitoring on the association between 
MDM and loan losses is reflected by the interaction variable (Tit × MDMi). The mod-
erating effect of female board representation on the association between MDM and 
loan losses is captured using the interaction variable (fit × MDMi). The idiosyncratic 
error term (uit) is model specific.
The model specification for investigating whether, when bundled, trade association 
quarterly monitoring and female board representation have a complementary or sub-
stitutive effect on loan losses (H4a and H4b) is given by,
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The final model specification for estimating the effect of monitoring bundle on the 
association between MDM and loan losses (H5) is as follows:
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where i = 1, . . ., N; t = 2002 to 2011; and ξit is now the idiosyncratic error term.
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The moderating effect of monitoring bundle on the association between MDM and 
loan losses is captured using the set of interaction variables 
j
















The mean values, standard deviations, and correlations between dependent and inde-
pendent variables are presented in Table 1 for the sample of 1,734 observations. 
Consistent with the literature on NPs, a relatively high mean for %WOB of 42.731% 
is reported in Table 1 (Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2015; Ward & Forker, 2017). Lower 
loan losses are associated with trade association monitoring (p ≤ .01), deprivation 
(p ≤ .05), size (p ≤ .01), and age (p ≤ .01). The negative pairwise correlation noted 
between loan losses and the deprivation measure (p ≤ .05) is contrary to that hypoth-
esized. Finally, board size is positively associated with loan losses (p ≤ .01). However, 
none of these correlations control for other confounding factors.
Monitoring Bundle
Table 2 presents loan losses across each bundle combination. The mean loan losses 
for the sample are 3.718%. The best performing bundle combination with the lowest 
loan losses is TM (mean, 2.222%) and the least effective is NM (mean, 5.944%). 
The average loan losses and variances in loan losses in bundle combinations with T 
are smaller to those reported in bundle combinations with N. When the loan losses 
for each bundle combination are compared with each other, statistically significant 
differences are detected for all bundle combinations other than NM and ND, and TM 
and TF (untabulated).
Estimation Results
CRE results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 3. Panel A presents the esti-
mates for two variants of Model 1. The first column of Table 3 reports the specifica-
tion using the %WOB measure (Model 1a), whereas the second reports the 
specification using the three categorical variables: M, D, and F (Model 1b). Panel B 
presents the findings for Models 2 and 3, which investigate the relationship between 
bundle combinations of different levels of trade association financial monitoring (N, T) 
and female board representation (M, D, F), MDM, and loan losses. The test statistics 
for the differential effects of bundle combinations on loan losses are relative to the 
base group bundle combination NM in Models 2 and 3. In addition, F tests are 
reported in Panel C to determine if the estimated pairwise differences between the 
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Deprivation, monitoring mechanisms, and loan losses. Evaluating H1, given the use of the 
interaction effects in the model estimated in Table 3, requires the computation of the 
marginal effect of loan losses with respect to MDM. These are calculated using the 
relevant estimates from Model 1a in conjunction with the average values for T and 
%WOB from Table 1. The resultant point estimate is computed as 0.015, that is, 0.077 
– (0.033 × 0.589) – (0.001 × 42.731). The corresponding asymptotic t ratio for the 
point estimate of this marginal effect is computed to be 0.00 (p = .957). Therefore, H1, 
which predicts a positive association between MDM and loan losses is rejected by the 
data in this case.
Trade association financial monitoring (T) results in lower loan losses, which is 
consistent with H2a. Using the estimates for Model 1a, the relevant estimated impact 
effect is computed to be −5.064 (p ≤ .01).5 Therefore, ceteris paribus, for credit unions 
with T monitoring, loan losses are 5.064% points lower than credit unions with N at 
the average level of MDM. The estimated effect for the interaction between the trade 
association and MDM (i.e., T × MDM) in Model 1a is not found to be statistically 
significant, thus confirming H2b.
H3a is rejected using Model 1a estimates, as no statistically significant association 
between %WOB and loan losses is detected when the overall marginal effect is 
computed.6 H3b is also rejected using Model 1b estimates to determine the impact 
effect on loan losses of F and D relative to M. Although credit unions (categorized as 
F) have lower loan losses relative to the base group in estimation M (−0.646% points 
lower), the estimated difference is just outside a conventional significance threshold of 
10% when using the interaction effects.7 D credit unions have higher loan losses rela-
tive to M credit unions (0.269% points higher). However, the impact effect difference 
is not found to be statistically significant.8 Consistent with H3c, %WOB moderates the 
positive association between MDM and loan losses. The estimate for the interaction 
term, %WOB × MDM, is found to be negative and statistically significant (Model 1a, 
coefficient −0.001, p ≤ .01). The results for the interaction terms, D × MDM and F × 
MDM, in Model 1b confirm the moderating effect of female board representation on 
the association between MDM and loan losses.
Table 2. Loan Losses by Monitoring Bundle.
Monitoring bundle NM ND NF TM TD TF Total
Number of observations 265 336 112 310 525 186 1,734
Panel A: Loan losses
 Mean (%) 5.944 5.670 4.510 2.222 2.566 2.289 3.718
 SD (%) 5.739 6.359 6.487 1.914 2.413 2.016 4.575
Note. Monitoring bundles are no quarterly trade association financial monitoring and: male-dominated 
board (NM); diversified board (ND); female-dominated board (NF). Quarterly trade association financial 
monitored and male-dominated board (TM); diversified board (TD); and female-dominated board (TF).  
F are boards where male directors do not have a critical mass; D are boards where both male and 
female directors have a critical mass; and M are boards where female directors do not have a critical 
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Bundle effects. In Model 2, credit unions with an NM bundle provide the base cat-
egory in estimation. The loan losses of credit unions with T bundle combinations 
(TM, TD, and TF) are significantly lower relative to the base case as indicated by the 
negative estimated coefficients reported (Panel B: TM, −4.037, p ≤ .01; TD, −3.777, 
p ≤ .01; TF, −4.154, p ≤ .01). In addition, credit unions with an NF bundle have sig-
nificantly lower loan losses relative to credit unions with an NM bundle (Panel B: NF, 
−1.444, p ≤ .10). Finally, as reported in Panel C, F tests reveal significant differences 
in the first seven pairwise comparisons between the bundle combinations ND and NF 
when compared with the other bundle combinations.
Following Oh et al. (2018), complementary and substitutive effects are investigated 
by identifying and matching loan loss values for (NM) and high (TF) monitoring bun-
dle combinations and determining the respective marginal benefit (loss). The condi-
tion for complementary and substitutive relationships, using the estimates from Model 
3, can be expressed as follows:
Complementary:
Reduction in loan losses (αNF – αNM) < Reduction in loan losses (αTF – αTM)
Substitutive:
Reduction in loan losses (αNF – αNM) > Reduction in loan losses (αTF – αTM)
Note: Bundles containing T, N, F, and M are identified for illustrative purposes.
The board dynamics literature also suggests that board behavior is influenced by 
the relative proportions of men and women on the board; hence, the analysis extends 
to investigate the respective marginal benefit (loss) from bundle combinations with D 
boards relative to those with F and M boards where the same conditions as above are 
tested using different combinations of the bundle.
As a prelude to these econometric tests, the differences in the raw data reported 
from Table 2 are examined in Table 4. Compared with NM bundle combinations, loan 
losses in credit unions with NF bundle combinations are 1.434% points lower (p ≤ 
.01), and loan losses in credit unions with TF bundle combinations are 0.067% points 
higher than in those with TM bundle combinations (Panel A: Diff2). Moreover, the 
difference-in-difference between these sample average loan loss differences is found 
to be statistically significant (Panel A: Diff1 – Diff2, −1.501% points, p ≤ .01).
We now formally test the two propositions above using the relevant econometric 
coefficient estimates obtained from Model 3. The difference-in-difference is found to 
be negative at −1.327% points—that is, −1.444 – (−0.117)—and statistically signifi-
cant with an asymptotic t ratio of −1.71 (p = .087). This confirms a substitutive effect 
and is consistent with H4a.
A similar approach is used to determine whether a complementary or substitutive 
effect exists between credit unions with an ND bundle (low) relative to credit unions 
with a TF bundle (high; Table 4: Panel B) and between credit unions with an NM 
bundle (low) relative to credit unions with a TD bundle (high). As noted in Panel B, 
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loan losses in credit unions with an NF bundle are lower to those reported for credit 
unions with an ND bundle (Diff1: 1.160% points lower) and they are lower in credit 
unions with a TF bundle relative to credit unions with a TD bundle (Diff2: 0.278% 
points lower). The difference is significant when the point estimates reported in Model 
3 (Table 3) are compared (Table 4, Panel B, Diff1 – Diff2, 1.981% points, p ≤ .05), 
indicating a substitution effect. Finally, in Panel C, there is no significant difference in 
the differences between the loan losses reported in credit unions with the bundle com-
binations ND and NM relative to those with TD and TM bundle combinations when 
the raw data and the adjusted point estimates are tested. The results confirm a substitu-
tion effect for T and F consistent with H4b.
Bundle interaction effects. Loan losses in credit unions with an NM bundle are posi-
tively associated with MDM (Table 3, Panel B, Model 3, coefficient 0.142, p ≤ .01). 
The estimates for the interaction effects show that when the bundle contains F, D, or 
T, there is a moderating effect of MDM on loan losses, relative to credit unions with 
an NM bundle. Moreover, the size, magnitude, and significance of the differences in 
the slopes between the five other bundle combinations and the NM bundle are broadly 
similar as reflected by the estimated interaction effects (Table 3: Model 3). To assess 
Table 4. Bundle Combinations: Complementary and Substitutive Effects.
Panel A
Bundlesa NF — NM Diff1 TF — TM Diff2 Diff1 – Diff2
 Unadjusted loan 
lossesb (%)
4.510 — 5.944 −1.434*** 2.289 — 2.222 0.067 −1.501***
 Adjusted 
differencesc (%)
−1.444–0 −1.444 −4.154–(−4.037) −0.117 −1.327*
Panel B
Bundles NF — ND Diff1 TF — TD Diff2 Diff1 – Diff2
 Unadjusted loan 
losses (%)
4.510 — 5.670 −1.160 2.289 — 2.567 −0.278 −0.88
 Adjusted 
differences (%)
−1.444–0.654 −2.098 −4.154–(−4.037) −0.117 −1.981**
Panel C
Bundles ND — NM Diff1 TD — TM Diff2 Diff1 – Diff2
 Unadjusted loan 
losses (%)
5.670 — 5.944 −0.274 2.567 — 2.222 0.345** −0.619
 Adjusted 
differences (%)
−3.777–(−4.037) 0.260 0.654–0 0.654 0.394
Note. aQuarterly trade association financial monitored and male-dominated board (TM), diversified board (TD), and 
female-dominated board (TF). Not quarterly trade association financial monitored and male-dominated board (NM), 
diversified board (ND), and female-dominated board (NF). bThe unadjusted loan losses are the mean loan losses 
reported for each bundle combination using the raw data as reported in Table 2. cThe adjusted differences are the 
ceteris paribus point estimate differences between the bundle combinations based on regression Model 2 in Table 3. 
Sample size: 1,734 observations from 182 credit unions.
*p ≤ .10. **p ≤ .05. ***p ≤ .01.
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the economic impact of MDM, the range value of 81.25 is selected for illustrative 
purposes (the maximum MDM value is 83.33 and the minimum is 2.08). Thus, credit 
unions with an NM bundle have loan losses that are 11.54% points (0.142 × 81.25) 
higher when the location has an MDM of 83.33 and credit unions with a TF bundle 
have loan losses that are 1.14% points ((0.142−0.156) × 81.25) lower relative to loan 
losses when MDM is 2.08. The results highlight the important role that bundle compo-
nent choice plays in reducing loan losses in deprived localities.
Control variables. The results reported in Table 3 are as predicted. Large credit 
unions and credit unions with larger boards report significantly lower loan losses 
across all econometric models. Older credit unions report significantly higher loan 
losses. Finally, relative to the base year, 2002, loan losses reported in later years are 
significantly higher (untabulated).
Robustness testing. Endogeneity is a problem inherent in board studies (Pathan & 
Faff, 2013). To test for endogeneity of a board’s female composition, data on the per-
centage of female counselors on local government councils over the period 2002 to 
2011 was hand-collected to create an instrumental variable (IV) to capture the extent 
of the accepted role of females within local communities. Credit union postcodes iden-
tified the relevant local council for each credit union. As a preliminary exercise, the 
percentage of female counselors is correlated with the %WOB of credit unions (0.19, 
p ≤ .01) and is not correlated with loan losses (−0.02, p = .43). On the basis of 
econometric testing, the instrument is found to be correlated with the potential prob-
lematic regressor (i.e., %WOB), rendering it a relevant instrument but orthogonal to 
the error structure determining credit union loan losses. The instrument is found to be 
statistically significant in the first stage regression, with the Wald transformed F test 
above the Stock–Yogo critical values (Stock & Yogo, 2005). Given the availability of a 
single instrument, we assess the orthogonality condition by including it in the loan loss 
equations and find it is statistically insignificant. Assuming it is a valid instrument, the 
use of the Hausman test reveals that the null of regressor exogeneity cannot be rejected 
in this case confirming the approach adopted in this study. Therefore, the %WOB is 
not endogenous with respect to loan losses.
To examine the potential impact of multicollinearity between age and size, the 
models were re-run with age and size included separately. To determine if the recent 
financial crisis had an impact, we included a dichotomous variable to capture the 
period before 2008 and after 2008, instead of separate year effects. In general, the 
results from these robustness tests portrayed similar directional relations with only 
minimal differences in statistical significance. The over-riding conclusions from the 
article remain unaltered by these robustness checks.
Discussion
The key findings are that monitoring mechanisms result in lower loan losses in credit 
unions, which is consistent with the prior literature. In an extension to this literature, 
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this study provides more nuanced insights including that the effectiveness of different 
monitoring mechanisms varies relative to the type of monitoring mechanism, the envi-
ronment, and in the presence of other monitoring mechanisms. Specifically, external 
trade association financial monitoring has a greater impact in reducing loan losses. 
This relationship is invariant when credit unions operate with higher levels of financial 
risk as captured by locality MDM. This finding lends support for the promotion of 
quarterly financial monitoring by an external regulator as is the case in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. However, quarterly financial monitoring by an exter-
nal body is costly in terms of systems and manpower and may not be feasible in 
emerging economies, in start-up credit unions, and in small credit unions that do not 
have sufficient membership numbers to generate the economies of scale required to 
fund the cost.
Consistent with the findings of Chakrabarty and Bass (2014) for cost efficiency, 
variation in the effectiveness of female board representation in moderating the asso-
ciation between MDM and loan losses is evident. The results highlight that at low 
levels of MDM, boards with higher %WOB have higher loan losses compared with 
boards with low %WOB. However, this pattern is reversed when MDM is high. This 
suggests females have a comparative advantage over males when strategizing credit 
policy in credit unions in deprived locations when information asymmetry increases. 
An increased need for additional internal monitoring is satisfied by female board rep-
resentation, possibly due to stronger links with community networks (Hillman et al., 
2007). This result provides more nuanced understanding of the findings of Ward and 
Forker (2017), specifically, the positive association between female board representa-
tion and loan book quality is driven by the superior performance of women in credit 
unions in deprived localities and in those that are not subject to trade association 
monitoring.
The differential benefits of bundle combinations with different levels of the two 
monitoring mechanisms reveals that credit unions with the monitoring bundle (NM) 
have the highest loan losses. Moreover, the impact of a high monitoring mechanism (T 
or F) serves to reduce loan losses by more when the other mechanism in the bundle is 
low (N or M) relative to the impact reported when the other mechanism in the bundle 
is high (F or T). Thus, these monitoring mechanisms substitute for, rather than comple-
ment, each other to reduce loan losses.
The theoretical implications of the findings are that the assumption of indepen-
dence for monitoring mechanisms should be revised to a bundle approach that con-
siders the costs and benefits of different levels of monitoring mechanism. Although 
trade association monitoring is associated with lower loan losses, a lower cost inter-
nal monitoring mechanism—female board representation—is found to substitute for 
this more costly mechanism, particularly when credit unions are in deprived loca-
tions. Therefore, this study extends theory on the scope of a “bundle approach” by 
examining in-depth the effect of different levels of two monitoring mechanisms to the 
context of NP organizations. Moreover, it offers important implications for regulatory 
design. In particular, a flexible approach is supported to enable credit unions to select 
the bundle combination of monitoring mechanisms to best suit their environment. 
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Guidance could promote female board appointments to critical levels in credit unions 
in deprived locations, particularly in the absence of trade association monitoring. The 
study also offers a potential explanation for the variation across the results in NP 
gender-based studies on the effectiveness of individual monitoring mechanisms on 
loan losses.
Limitations and Future Research
The study assumes that affiliation to a specific trade association in Northern Ireland 
results in stronger monitoring as this trade association undertakes quarterly financial 
analysis using financial ratios whereas the other credit unions are not subject to quar-
terly financial monitoring during this period. It is also possible, however, that other 
services provided by this trade association contribute to lower loan losses (Forker 
et al., 2014). The findings infer that female director appointments strengthen monitor-
ing in more deprived localities. It is difficult to identify the explicit reason for this 
comparative advantage over boards that are male dominant. Research identifies a link 
among female board members, increased independence, and improved monitoring 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). However, we cannot confirm that lower loan losses noted 
in credit unions in deprived locations is a consequence of additional monitoring by 
females, as the study does not explicitly identify monitoring activity. Nevertheless, 
other reasons adduced in the literature support an explanation of a beneficial effect 
from female directors namely that females foster high levels of trust relationships with 
borrowers leading to fewer defaults (Beck et al., 2013) and that females have wider 
networks with the membership (Hillman et al., 2007) enabling them to obtain volun-
teers and to strengthen bonds that leads to fewer defaults. Finally, other factors that 
influence board performance that are not controlled for in this study, due to limits on 
data availability, are auditor quality, director experience, director education, director 
contacts, years of service on the board, and whether directors worked as a volunteer in 
the credit union beforehand (Themudo, 2009).
Conclusion
The recent financial crisis has impacted the financial services sector with more strin-
gent regulation being introduced in many countries for financial institutions and a 
push toward standardization in the rules that apply across different organizational 
forms. The consequences of increased regulation for small, community, member-gov-
erned financial organizations are potentially serious, possibly resulting in closure, as 
public regulation and external compliance monitoring is costly, and many community 
organizations do not have the economies of scale to absorb the additional costs.
In general, the findings that choosing financial monitoring by trade association 
reduces loan losses provide support for financial regulation in credit unions. However, 
in the absence of trade association monitoring, credit unions with female-dominant 
boards have a moderating effect on loan losses as deprivation increases. An investiga-
tion of the effect of a bundle of different levels of external trade association financial 
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monitoring and internal monitoring by female directors on loan losses report a substi-
tutive effect. The findings provide support for a flexible approach to regulation 
designed to reduce loan losses in community-based financial institutions, such as 
credit unions. This evidence is particularly pertinent to the worldwide credit union 
movement, given the high levels of poverty and the profusion of small credit unions 
combined with the recent emphasis on increased public regulation and the adverse 
potential impact that it may have on outreach.
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Notes
1. During the period of this study (2002–2011), the Registrar was responsible for overseeing 
the financial soundness of the credit union sector. As part of this process, the Registrar 
required credit unions to complete a table analyzing their loan book balance into bands 
reflecting length of time overdue. These bands are used to calculate a recommended loan 
loss allowance using percentages set by the Registrar. In 2012, this responsibility trans-
ferred to the Financial Services Authority.
2. In some countries, for example the United States and Australia, some credit unions pay 
their directors (Unda et al., 2017).
3. Although women on boards are mooted to improve governance by reducing agency costs, 
this does not necessarily mean improved financial management. Indeed, it is argued that 
too much interference can have a negative impact on financial management (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009).
4. Nonlinearity was tested in the present study but is not found to be statistically significant.
5. The point estimate is calculated using Model 1a estimates as the impact effect of T on 
loan losses using the sample average value of multiple deprivation measure (MDM) from 
Table 1. This is computed as −4.161 – (0.033 × 27.382) = −5.064 and has an asymptotic 
t ratio of −5.02 and a corresponding p value of .000.
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6. The estimate for the marginal effect of loan losses with respect to %WOB using the sample 
average values for MDM from Table 1 and the point estimates from Model 1a is computed 
as 0.006—that is, 0.033 – (0.001 × 27.382)—with an asymptotic t ratio of 0.15, and a cor-
responding p value of .700.
7. The point estimate is calculated as an impact effect using the estimates from Model 1b 
and the sample average of MDM from Table 1. The point estimate is computed as 1.435 
– (0.076 × 27.382) = −0.646 with an asymptotic t ratio of −1.60 and a corresponding p 
value of .109.
8. The point estimate is calculated as an impact effect using the sample average of MDM 
from Table 1 and the point estimates from Model 1b. The point estimate is computed 
as 1.775 – (0.055 × 27.382) = 0.269 with an asymptotic t ratio of 1.00 and a corre-
sponding p value of .317.
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